The rupture of the mimetic epistemological model /

Rompimento do modelo epistemológico mimético

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Received: January, 25th, 2021. **Approved:** January, 27th, 2021.

How to cite this article:

BRANDÃO, Jack. The rupture of the mimetic epistemological model. *Revista Letras Raras*. Campina Grande, v. 10, n.1, p. 184-203, jan. 2021.

ABSTRACT

Mimesis as an epistemological model originated in ancient Greece when artists imitated their masters and followed pre-established models. Humanism, in turn, rescues this model and improves it: just as Vergil imitated Homer, Dante imitated Vergil; if Petrarch sought in the classics the source of inspiration for his poetry, Camões, in turn, makes the sonnets from the Italian as his model, to mention a few examples. However, such a procedure did not represent plagiarism, as it was a way to honor the masters. This model reached its peak in the 17th century, declining in the following centuries, especially in the 19th century. However, with its rupture, the representation models permeated Western culture for centuries were lost, leading subjectivity to assume the preponderant role in art. More than a change in the perception of art, there was a change in the world's perception that surrounds humanity, whose significant influence was due to photography.

KEYWORDS: Mimesis; Iconology; Representation; Baroque; Iconophotology.

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<http://dx.doi.org/10.35572/rlr.v10i1.1944>

RESUMO

A mimese como modelo epistemológico teve sua origem na Grécia antiga, quando os artistas imitavam seus mestres e seguiam os modelos preestabelecidos; o Humanismo, por sua vez, resgata esse modelo e o aperfeiçoa: da mesma maneira que Virgílio imitou Homero, Dante imitou Virgílio. Petrarca, por exemplo, buscou nos clássicos a fonte de inspiração para seus sonetos; Camões, por sua vez, faz dele seu modelo, só para citar alguns exemplos. Tal procedimento, contudo, não representava plágio, já que era uma maneira de homenagear os mestres. Tal modelo teve seu apogeu no século XVII, entrando em declínio nos séculos seguintes, de modo especial no século XIX. Com seu rompimento, porém, perderam-se os modelos de representação que permearam a cultura ocidental por séculos, levando a subjetividade a assumir o papel preponderante na arte. Mais do que uma mudança na percepção da arte, verificou-se uma mudança na percepção do mundo que cerca o homem, cuja grande influência deveu-se à fotografia.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Mimese; Iconologia; Representação; Seiscentismo; Iconofotografia.

1 From Lessing to German romantics

Breaking barriers: a striking feature of humanity throughout its existence, whether transporting gigantic stones – to build pyramids – or exceeding the speed of sound – in an aircraft. Examples abound. The human being himself can be considered a barrier overcome within nature because possessing a fragile complexion, meeting conditions that would hinder his survival in a hostile environment, surrounded by much stronger beings and, apparently, more capable of winning the setbacks of evolution. However, the *lógos* (λόγος) combined with *téchne* (τέχνη) made the difference, causing fragility to become solidity.

However, the transposed barrier highlighted in this article is neither in the remote past nor in a close one. It refers to the rupture of *mimesis* (μίμησις) as an epistemological value, whose decline began to be outlined in an incipient way in the 18th century, improved in the 19th century, and became effective in the 20th century.

From this rupture, it would only be up to the artist to demonstrate his creative genius since his artistic work – be it pictorial or poetic – would no longer be linked to tradition but to expression. Besides, the relationship established by these two arts, the *Ut pictura poesis*, was broken. That was put in check, already in the 18th century, by Lessing in his work *Laocoonte: An essay on the limits of painting and poetry*, when, in demarcating the boundaries between poetry and painting, he anticipates the break between the two artistic expressions, whose interrelation it had been harmonious since the Renaissance, as shown by iconologies and emblems (BRANDÃO, 2010a).

Lessing delimits the field of action of both image and writing to two non-interchangeable aspects: *time* and *space*. The former would be in charge of poetry, the latter of painting. That, for example, “must therefore choose the [moment] one which is most suggestive and from which the

preceding and succeeding actions are most easily comprehensible.” (LESSING, 1984, p. 78) Thus, the painting must renounce time; ergo, progressive actions cannot be part of its object. Therefore, it must be content with activities next to each other or with mere bodies that suggest an action through its positions. (LESSING, 1984)

When writing, it would be necessary to develop the actions that are painted as the reader reads (LESSING, 1984), in a continuous act of protension and retention; finally, “we are not able to apprehend a text in a single moment” (ISER, 1999, p. 11), as we do with any object. That is because it, as an object of perception, becomes evident as a whole since we are before it; the text, in turn, can only be apprehended as an “object” in consecutive phases of reading; after all, we are inside it, through reading. (ISER, 1999, p. 12)

Since the end of the 18th century, the concept of *μίμησις* was being abolished and rejected by young German romantics who aimed not only at complete freedom in artistic creation but also at a new affirmation of art. No longer explicitly aimed at the mere imitation of nature, but at the spirit’s production and reproduction. For example, Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling proposes not the total negation of the mimetic principle but its transformation. (GONÇALVES, 2001) In turn, Friedrich Schlegel saw in Romanticism a definitive aesthetic change, the central meaning of which would be to free art from its mimetic function on nature and its inferior form of apprehending the truth from the consolidation of the idea that art is produced by a free and naturally creative subjectivity, at the same time intellectual and intuitive, conscious and unconscious of and in his artistic creation. (GONÇALVES, 2001)

Hegel (1988) also makes a stern criticism of mimesis in his work *Aesthetics: Lecture on fine art*, when addressing its different currents. For the German philosopher, the mimetic epistemological model assigns art a purely formal purpose: remaking, with the means available to the artist, what exists in the natural world, ergo, that correspondence nature-art “is supposed to afford complete satisfaction.” (HEGEL, 1988, p. 41-42)

However, such efforts are superfluous and “may even be regarded as a presumptuous game which falls far short of nature” (HEGEL, 1988, p. 42) because the art “can only produce one-sided deceptions, for example, a pure appearance of reality for one sense only, and if it abides by the formal aim of mere imitation, it provides not the reality of life but only a pretense of life.” (HEGEL, 1988, p. 42) More significant than the mere pleasure of imitating nature, a “relative pleasure,” the human being should feel what comes from himself, from his spirit. (HEGEL, 1988, p. 27) Thus, the philosopher says:

The beauty of art is beauty born of the spirit and born again, and the higher the spirit and its productions stand above nature and its phenomena, the higher too is the beauty of art above that of nature.

[...]

But what is higher about the spirit and its artistic beauty is not something merely relative in comparison with nature. On the contrary, the spirit is alone the true, comprehending everything in itself, so that everything beautiful is truly beautiful only as sharing in this higher sphere and generated by it. In this sense, the beauty of nature only as a reflection of the beauty that belongs to spirit, as an imperfect, incomplete mode [of beauty], a mode which in its substance is contained in the spirit itself. (HEGEL, 1988, p. 2)

Thus, the more the pictographic and poetic arts distanced themselves, the more each other's independence naturally increased. In the 19th century, it was possible to verify that, in painting, a real exorcism of literary elements starts in its creative process: it begins with Impressionism and culminates in abstract and conceptual artwork or both. Through the break with the orthodox tradition of language and textuality (iconography), painters of different modernist tendencies focused on developing the purely visual. (SCHØLLHAMMER, 2001)

Simultaneously with the breaking of the mimetic domain in art, there is a detachment of the artistic work from the models pre-established by the iconological and emblematic treatises. These were overlooked, resulting in the fact that the 17th-century artistic creation, for example, was considered obscure and full of polluting and unnecessary details. However, what was deemed superfluous to this artistic work would correspond to the lack of knowledge of its codification, that is, the evident diachronic cultural vacuum.

Figure 1 – *Mary Magdalene*, by Pedro de Mena, 1664

To illustrate the ostracism to which these artistic works have been relegated, let us take as an example the work *Mary Magdalene* by the Spanish sculptor Pedro de Mena (fig. 1). It is possible to compare it to others whose thematic object represents Mary Magdalene and to visualize its different approaches throughout history. Thus it will be possible to glimpse, even if superficially, its own iconological fading.

2 The iconological fading

Before Pedro de Mena's work, one can have the impression of facing a unique and original representation. However, if we compare it with others from the same period, it is possible to verify similarities among his contemporaries due to certain regularities with which the period's artists addressed similar themes. Thus, it appears that these works were neither singular nor original; after all, specific rules of representation were followed, defined by pre-established manuals and treaties, which resulted in similar artistic works: the features of the represented were modified, not the representation mode. (BRANDÃO, 2010a)

Figure 2 – *Penitent Magdalene*, by Donatello, 1453-55

With the fading and disappearance of the rhetorical precepts that governed the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, the use of certain iconic elements widely used in that period would pass to the later centuries or be ignored or used as a mere pictorial “adornment,” as seen with the use of the skull in figure 3.

In the Renaissance sculptural work by the Italian sculptor Donatello (fig. 2), Mary Magdalene is presented as an old woman “With a haggard face, clothed in unfortunate and poor clothes (...), gazing intently at the Heavens¹” (RIPA, 2007, p. 190); which, in an iconological reading, would represent, in Cesare Ripa’s Iconology, a sign of “Penance.”

However, her hands, unlike Mena’s work, are together so that they can indicate, according to the current iconology:

a) The “Third Blessedness” (RIPA, 2007, p. 150) from Gospel: “Blessed are you who are weeping now: you shall laugh” (Lk 6, 21b), and

b) “Spiritual Meditation” because “With the hands together, one against the other, thus symbolizing the effect of devotion and humility found in people, continuing and exercising in this way, the measure and scope of Spiritual Meditation” (RIPA, 2007, p. 64).

c) On the other hand, the desolate aspect of the image could also lead the 17th-century reader to read it even as an indication of “Melancholia”:

An older woman, unfortunate and in pain, dressed in coarse cloth and without any ornament. [...].

She portrays herself as an older woman because the young people are usually the happiest, and the old, on the contrary, melancholic, as Virgil says [...].

She is poorly dressed and lacking in adornment, like trees, when they are seen without leaves and fruit; she never lifts her spirits to the melancholic to the point of procuring the necessary comforts to provide or avoid the evils that she imagines haunt her² (RIPA, 2007, p. 65).

The same cannot be said of Magdalene of the Italian sculptor Antonio Canova (fig. 3), portrayed as a young, beautiful, and sensual woman who, sitting on her legs, poses in an attitude our view, of adoration, of surrender, of prayer. However, her body’s disposition and gestures would not correspond to the actions listed, according to the iconological models from the 16th to the 18th centuries.

When representing “Prayer,” a woman was painted “kneeling and with open arms to show the reverence that one should have towards God, and in a particular way if one were praying³” (RIPA, 2007, p. 160)

Figure 3 - *Mary Magdalene*, by Antonio Canova, 1809

The attitude of keeping arms open, demonstrating prayer is ancient, and there are several examples in the proto-Christian world: the church of Saints John and Paul, in Rome (4th century); the image of Proculus in the catacomb of Saint Januarius, in Naples (5th century); the mosaic of the entrance to the church of Saint Demetrius in Thessaloniki (6th century); the mural painting at the Monastery of Saint Jeremiah, in Saqqara, Egypt (7th century), among others. (BELTING, 2009)

In addition to open arms, the head should be facing the sky, which differs from Canova's sculpture:

Raising the head, looking towards the light that we said before, clearly shows us [...] that Prayer does not come to consist but in a particular elevation or sublimity of the mind and excitement of our affection, so that man [...] is sincere with God [...]¹ (RIPA, 2007, p. 160).

¹ “[...] *El llevar levantada la cabeza, mirando hacia la luz que antes dijimos, claramente nos muestra [...], que la Oración no viene a consistir sino en cierta elevación o sublimidad de la mente y excitación de nuestro afecto, de manera que el hombre [...] se sincera con Dios [...].*”

Figure 4 - Mary Magdalene as a Hermit, by Francesco Hayez, 1825

The 17th-century readers, for example, might even read Magdalene's eyes down as a sign of humility: "Woman in white clothes; her eyes are lowered while holding a tender little lamb in her arm. [...] She must be dressed in a sack while trampling on some very valuable-looking clothes"² (RIPA, 2007, p. 499).

It is even possible to verify that Magdalene by Canova has a dress girded by a rope similar to that by Pedro Mena and that she is on few clothes: but sitting on her legs would not show the proper "reverence to be had towards God"³ (RIPA, 2007, p. 160).

Figure 5 - Mary Magdalene in the Cave, by Jules Josef Lefevre, 1876.

² "[...]Mujer con traje blanco; lleva los ojos bajos, mientras sostiene en brazo un tierno Corderillo. [...] Ha de ir vestida de saco, mientras que pisotea algunas ropas de aspecto valiosísimo.

³ "[...] reverencia que se debe tener para con Dios."

Figure 2

Mary Magdalene in the Cave by Jules Josef Lefebvre, 1876.

The only visible sign that would refer to “Penance” would be the skull used as an ornament next to the young woman. According to the emblematic models, other essential elements – the cilice, the crucifix, and her knees – are absent.

It can be seen that readers from the 19th century want to glimpse the plasticity of the work, are interested in its aesthetic beauty, its creativity, its subjectivity, in short, how the theme was approached. Times are already different, and even if the iconological elements appear, they will always be mere adornments, as in figure 4. Most of Francesco Hayez’s contemporaries will likely restrict their imagery reading to the pre-iconographical description or an iconographical analysis (PANOFSKY, 2004); however, they will hardly enter the iconological interpretation. That is because this referential, when lost, was covered by a canopy that covers a large part of its signal character, so it will no longer be possible to visualize the original idea nor imagine what the original conception of the work would have been like in Lefebvre’s image.

From sacred – the representation of a saint from the Catholic Church – the image could become pagan, as it could represent any Greco-Roman deity. Here is the result of aesthetic freedom and creativity, whose choice is left to the artist, demonstrating that the power of creation is now in his hands.

Figure 6 – *The Life of Mary Magdalene*, by Salvador Dalí, 1960

The creative freedom and the possibility of experimentation in the arts' realm would be unthinkable for the people of the 16th century. They were linked to *μίμησις* and under the influence of the iconologies that circulated in the period. This *status quo* represented an obstacle to creativity, at least along the lines propagated by Romanticism, because creative freedom was curtailed. Therefore, it does not surprise Schlegel and the German romantics' stubbornness, for whom a free and creative subjectivity should produce art. They longed for a self that fled pre-established models, mere imitation, and turned to the individual, to the emotional. They, therefore, rejected the collective rationalism to which they were subjected.

The 19th century freed itself from *μίμησις*, not from images. The imagery field increased beyond the emblematic genre's borders and the iconologies and all the ancient traditions that accompanied them. If the images were previously connected to epistemological and paradigmatic models, now they were free to permeate unimaginable elements; after all, they entered the domain of pure creation (*ποίησις*). The reality is to create the non-real, as seen in contemporary art with the total rupture of the image-text relationship proposed since the Renaissance. Despite this rupture, some remains persisted, no longer as precepts to be obeyed, but under the artist's direction and domain.

In "The Life of Mary Magdalene" (fig. 6), Salvador Dalí mixes surreal elements with those of the Renaissance – the same found in the iconologies and the emblematic genre – revealed by this canvas's figuration. However, he used them by choice, not by imposition.

Therefore, when it is said that there was a break in the image-text interrelation, the 17th-century art driving principle, does not mean it ceased to exist, or it does not exist today. On the contrary, this relationship expanded explosively in the humanities so that the image, for some theorists as W. J. Thomas Mitchell, emerges as a paradigm within these exact sciences:

the relationship between literature and image is no longer limited to literary work's singular encounter with visual work. However, the broader perspective of studies on visibilities, visual culture, and the technological development of new forms of visual representation must be seen in the broader perspective of studies. (SCHØLLHAMMER, 2001, p. 31)

3 The question of style

In this way, we could infer, however paradoxical it may seem, that the liberation of painting concerning poetry (and vice versa) was momentary; that is to say, there was, in fact, a break with the old *epistème* (*επιστήμη*): no longer looking for a faithful representation of nature, reality or, as the

German theorist Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht says: “the literary texts written today returned to present “worlds” to his readers.” (FARINACCIO, 2004, p. 11)

Authors like Gabriel García Márquez (*One Hundred Years of Solitude*) or Umberto Eco (*The Name of the Rose*) described neither the typical reality of the Caribbean nor the real medieval world. They either proposed or claimed for themselves allegiance to any pre-existing referents (FARINACCIO, 2004, p.12). Otherwise, the authors of the 17th century sought their model in the classics, for whom the work should be realistic, be based on the real without, however, worrying about history. After all, those authors were unaware of the idea of “historical forces” (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 33), perhaps because classic texts, such as those of Homer, always seem legendary, disconnected, unreal even though they are not entirely:

[...] so long as we are reading or hearing the poems, it does not matter whether we know that all this is the only legend, “make-believe.” [...] Homer [...] does not need to base his story on historical reality, his reality is powerful enough in itself; it ensnares us, weaving its web around us, and that suffices him. And this “real” world into which we are lured, exists for itself, contains nothing but itself; the Homeric poems conceal nothing, they contain no teaching and no secret second meaning (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 13).

Auerbach (2003) shows us, for example, the difference in focus between the Homeric and the biblical text: the former aimed at reality – through immediacy, fluidity, and narrative simplicity – while the latter aimed exclusively at “truth” due to its religious character and its claim “to represent universal history” (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 16). One text intends to “please” and “enchant” – such the Homeric –, while another to “indoctrinate” and “promise” – as the biblical, especially the Old Testament –, hence its obscure and metaphorical character (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 15) that will run through Antiquity and will be reused in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Baroque, as attested by the emblematic genre with its moralizing precepts.

As we inherited, in the West, both Hellenic and Hebrew culture, we may be tempted to reverse the end to which each genre proposes, that is, we read “seriousness” and “reality” in a biblical text, or “doctrine” and “fantasy” in a classic; or, still, we believe to finding the “truth” in both. We will not get any of the proposals presented. Even citing Auerbach (2003), this shows us that:

In modern literature, the technique of imitation can evolve a serious, problematic, and tragic conception of any character regardless of the type and social standing, of any occurrence regardless of whether it be legendary, broadly political, or narrowly domestic; and in most cases, it actually does so. Precisely that is completely impossible in antiquity (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 31).

This impossibility is due to the separation of styles; that is, for us, any question represented via literature or painting, regardless of whether the character conceived belongs to a high or low social class, can lead us to the commotion, to meditation. That would never happen with the ancients, for whom the representation

[...] of everyday occupations and social classes – merchants, artisans, peasants, slaves – of everyday scenes and places-home, shop, field, store – of everyday customs and institutions – marriage, children, work, earning a living in short, of the people and its life (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 31).

could never literally be taken seriously, as they never “leave the realm of the comic” (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 31). Such an individual would never have time in a society where there was a clear separation between what could be represented by the upper class and those considered inferior. Moreover, because there was no concept of the action of historical forces, people were seen from other values: the ancients were mainly interested in the moral problem – which would only reside in the aristocracy – therefore, the individual prevailed over the collective:

No matter how many persons may be branded as given to vice or as ridiculous, criticism of vices and excesses poses the problem as one for the individual; consequently, social criticism never leads to a definition of the motive forces within society (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 32).

That same separation extended to what they considered beautiful and ugly. The ugly and the grotesque (low style) were restricted to the lower classes; to the upper level, the beautiful and the virtuous (high style). In this regard, Bossuet, a 17th-century theologian, tells us:

Thus a poet's entire design, the entire aim of his labors, is that we, like his hero, should be in love with beautiful women [people], that we should serve them as if they were divinities; in a word, that we should sacrifice all to them, unless perhaps it be honor, the love of which is even more dangerous than love of beauty (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 393).

On the contrary, today, we can find truths and beauty in the words of a cook, a clerk, a waiter: these, regardless of who is being represented or starred, can be reached in the same way: the Hunchback of Notre Dame, despite his aspect, seems kind to us, it becomes beautiful, liable to produce *pathos* (πάθος). For the classics, such a representation would be impossible; that is, Victor Hugo's character would never lead them to the commotion but laughter. In the 19th century, a significant transformation of the previous model can be felt that would not be restricted only to the thematic realm

(the total breakdown of styles, for example), not even to the formation and representation of images the human eye and observation itself.

4 Subjectivity and recognition of the world

The human eye and observation would no longer be the same since the 19th century, and the prominent role for such changes is due to photography, term/departure of a wave of transformations verified throughout that century. By the “term,” we mean that it was the threshold of transformations processed in the century of its appearance and the subsequent ones, the result of which was the change in how human beings see themselves and the world they are surrounded. According to Jonathan Crary (1992), these transformations would even lead to the prevailing Renaissance thought rupture, whose apex was the darkroom.

Through that, a mimetic parameter par excellence, human interference in imagery production, was disregarded, thus submitting itself to the rigid physical laws of refraction and reflection, in whose power it would not be up to man to interfere, but only to accept it. Therefore, there was an external relationship between subject and object of observation; that is, the act of seeing is removed from the physical body of the observer:

At the same time, another related and equally decisive function of the camera was to sunder the act of seeing from the physical body of the observer, to decorporealize vision. The monadic viewpoint of the individual is authenticated and legitimized by the camera obscura, but the observer's physical and sensory experience is supplanted by the relations between a mechanical apparatus and a pre-given world of objective truth (CRARY, 1992, p. 39-40).

Previously, the darkroom's authority of itself did not allow the individual to interfere in the physical process of imagery creation due to the physical laws of the propagation of light; after all, the images that were projected on the dark background of the chamber were due to the effect of natural laws that were independent of the body contingent and changing man (FERRAZ, 2005).

Nevertheless, since the Renaissance, the imputed rigidity to art, and the consequent use of mathematics and the exact sciences to explain the formation of the image (concepts of light, refraction, and reflection), new philosophical ideas began to modify this rationalist *Weltanschauung* towards the end of 18th century. As an example, we have the importance of subjectivity to recognize the world in which people are inserted. This search for subjectivity that sees, feels, and interferes in the vision as

something not merely external to the individual, could be seen, even in Kant, in his work “Critique of pure reason” (1787), when he affirms that “our representation of things as they are given to us does not conform to these things as they are in themselves but rather that these objects as appearances conform to our way of representing [...]” (KANT, 1998, p. 112).

Still, according to the German philosopher, we know what is possible to pass through the sieve of our sensitivity, right through our gaze, without which it is ignored:

[...] our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being (KANT, 1998, p. 185).

Figure 7 – *The geographer*, by Jan van Vermeer, 1668

Crary demonstrates, metaphorically, the importance of the darkroom in the period before the 19th century, as in the 16th century, using two works by a well-known painter of the period, the Dutchman Jan van Vermeer, whose canvases *The astronomer* (1668) and *The geographer* (1668/69 - fig. 7)

represent the scholars who name them. Each of them, absorbed in their chores, locked up in their study environments, where we see objects that translate their trades: in one, there is a celestial globe; in other, nautical charts:

Each has his eyes averted from the aperture that opens onto the outside. The exterior world is known not by direct sensory examination but through a mental survey of its “clear and distinct” representation within the room, the somber isolation of these meditative scholars within their walled interiors is not in at least an obstacle to apprehending the world outside, for the division between interiorized subject and the exterior world is a pre-given condition of knowledge about the latter (CRARY, 1992, p. 46).

Following, Crary shows us the relationship between the inner world and the external world. The study/work environment represents the former and the latter by the globe, maps, and nautical charts. The paintings, therefore, intended to show the reconciliation of the function of the darkroom, whose interior would be the interface between what Descartes considered as different terms: *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. The latter would be the domain of matter, the outside world’s visibility; the former, as the matter is visualized from each one’s individuality by the mind’s field and the spirit. Through the light that enters the internal environment – similar to the hole through which the light penetrates the interior of the darkroom – the scholar can get to know the external world, represented by maps, letters, images, across the globe, without having to leave its enclosure: one has access, therefore, to a projection of the world, interacts with it without being able to interfere in it, without being able to modify it, in a passive attitude in the face of the dazzle of the world formed internally. His attitude is one of mere contemplation, although palpable, of reality: one is facing the outside world represented by the star globe, by nautical charts, by maps; in short, *res extensa*, but this contemplation is only possible because his mind interferes in the process, a *res cogitans*, hence the non-reconciliation between the two Cartesian terms that the darkroom breaks:

The production of the camera is always a projection onto a two-dimensional surface – here maps, globes, charts, and images. Each of the thinkers, in a rapt stillness, ponders that crucial feature of the world, its extension, so mysteriously unlike the unextended immediacy of their own thoughts yet rendered intelligible to mind by clarity of these representations, by magnitudinal relations (CRARY, 1992, p. 46).

Goethe (1810), in turn, also calls into question – based on the work “*Zur Farbenlehre*” – this distancing relationship between man and the world provided by the darkroom, proposing a simple experience, from which the emptying of the classical system and *epistème* that jettisoned the body image:

Let a room be made as dark as possible; let there be a circular opening in the windowshutter about three inches in diameter, which may be closed or not at pleasure. The sun being suffered to shine through this on a white surface, let the spectator from some little distance fix his eyes on the bright circle thus admitted. The hole being then closed, let him look towards the darkest part of the room; a circular image will now be seen to float before him. The middle of this circle will appear bright, colorless, or somewhat yellow, but the border will at the same moment appear red (GOETHE, 1840, p.16).

Goethe shows us that when the orifice of the chamber is closed, the eyes see in the darkness because they will see several images of different colors, coming no longer from the light rays external to the body, but from the body itself:

After a time, this red, increasing towards the center, covers the whole circle, and at last, the bright central point. However, no sooner is the entire circle red than the edge begins to be blue and the blue gradually encroaches inwards on the red. When the whole is blue, the edge becomes dark and colorless. This darker edge again slowly encroaches on the blue till the whole circle appears colorless. The image then becomes gradually fainter, and at the same time, diminishes in size. Here again, we see how the retina recovers itself by a succession of vibrations after the powerful external impression it received (GOETHE, 1840, p. 16-17).

Observations demonstrate that it is no longer physics, nor mathematical and external logic to the human being that preside over vision, but the eye itself with its inherent physiology that perceives the world itself, no longer as an imposed external reality, without its effective participation:

When the production of images itself can be disconnected from an external, fixed, stable, secure “world,” the certainties concerning both the subject and the object were simultaneously destabilized; in the same gesture, the processes of perception and knowledge are necessarily the target of experimentation, observation, description, and science (FERRAZ, 2005, p. 50).

For this, it is necessary the participation of the “I” observer who will effectively engage in the construction of images, no longer passively but actively. That is why Crary states, based on the concepts addressed by Goethe, that:

The corporeal subjectivity of the observer, which was a priori excluded from the concept of camera obscura, suddenly becomes the site on which an observer is possible. The human body, in all its contingency and specificity generates “the spectrum of another color”, and thus becomes the active producer of optical experience (CRARY, 1992, p. 69).

A significant knowledge/development of optical physiology is seen since, from the stereoscope⁴, the body becomes an intrinsic component of the machine itself. Through the optical instrument, the person has a binocular's vision and three-dimensional from the object. Because of this participation, looking is not more just a passive act, from a mere spectator of the scene/image like that conceived in the classical theater, becomes active: "someone who sees within the scope of a set of possibilities, someone who is constrained by a system of conventions and limitations" (MACHADO, 2002, p. 229). The stereoscopic image, therefore, breaks with the Renaissance perspective from a single vanishing point,

Consequently, it modifies the traditional concept of "point of view," that is, that particular relationship of an observer with the object of his vision, around which meaning has been established for centuries. There being no vanishing point or unique point of view, there is also no hegemony of a unilocular perspective code, like the one that guided all Western history from the 15th century onwards (MACHADO, 2002, p. 230-231).

5 The role of photography in the new perception

At that moment, it is necessary to return to what has been said concerning the paradox of the rupture of the pictorial and poetic genres so that we can continue this study, whose vertex is, precisely, photography. We could infer that this rupture did not happen entirely, but similar to pre-Avant-gardism, since it was, at first, only a change of direction. For example, for the avant-garde concretization, a period of commencement (as seen in figures 3, 4, and 5) was necessary. This stage was indispensable for there to be a break - in an abrupt and revolutionary way (fig. 6) - with the status quo, allowing the painting to know, in a more profound way, its object of study or use - the colors, the light, and the shadows. Something similar occurred with the literature and its relationship with words, syntax, and metrics. That made it possible for both of them to explore, in themselves, all the potential aesthetic possibilities, including using elements of the iconology itself, as Dalí probably did, not in an imposing way, but as paradigms to be used.

⁴ An optical instrument that allows you to see relief effects in flat images, from photographs (or drawings) obtained from the same object, taken from slightly different positions, whose separation may be similar to that between the eyes, thus allowing a vision binocular and the perception of the three-dimensionality of objects. The image that forms on each eye's retina is flat, but as there is, a small difference between them and the eyes are separated by 5 to 8 centimeters. The brain takes care of "merging" these two images into one, resulting in the three-dimensional effect. This three-dimensional effect can be simulated, even without the device, using two slightly different flat figures, such as those that would be projected on each retina, separately. Only, in this case, the eyes themselves must take charge of "mixing" the images before sending them to the brain. Thus, it is necessary to make the eyes converge to obtain an impression on the retinas that combine the figures' two flat images. However, some people find it challenging to do this since they cannot make this forced "change their eyes" movement. In these cases, the stereoscope's use solves the problem since it projects a different image in each eye, eliminating the need to force them to converge.

Evidently, in the 19th century, this movement was incipient. That would not yet be when we would see the total break with the old models, because what was glimpsed, effectively, was the short time of freedom that both aesthetics – writing and pictorial – had one concerning the other; after all, we saw an exchange of axis with the entry of a third element that not only intervenes in both but also influences them: the photography. In this way, poetry concerning painting was not vacant for a long time, and the reverse painting as a model of poetry (PRAZ, 1982, p. 4)⁵.

It is possible to verify that, even in the 19th century, photography took on the role that belonged to painting in previous centuries because the new technique, “far from opposing all pictorial tradition, did nothing but bet on its perpetuation, as it petrifies the archetypes that support it” (MACHADO, 2002, p. 150).

However, even so, its space was being conquered and, unlike the previous model, no longer as a paradigm to be followed and emulated, but as a new option to portray nature in an apparently precise and highly mimetic way⁶, when the τέχνη human acts without the need for human hands, creating a technical painting or technical art par excellence.

Therefore, this displacement of poetry/painting → poetry/photography would be a natural consequence of human advancement and the use of its τέχνη, so we must observe that:

a) in the first relationship (poetry/painting), whose guiding principle was μίμησις, iconologies were used, the image (pictorial and sculptural) was subject to the tutelage of the λόγος that directed them. Thus, there was a one-way street: from iconologies (including emblem books) to artistic work (painting, sculpture, poetry). The artists – mere *technites* (τεχνίτης) –, had no room for creativity, whose concept was unknown to him;

b) in the other relationship (poetry/photography), the mimetic germ disappears, although the photograph is, *a priori*, mimetic par excellence. Iconophotologies are used; however, they do not exist in themselves as compilations to be observed, studied, and/or used, but as an individual collection built over the years by a person in a particular community (BRANDÃO, 2010b, p. 94-97). There is, therefore, a two-way street: since the artist can start from both nature and himself, from his inner iconophotological collection, that is, from the photographic images that permeate his memory. The choice is no longer an imposition; it depends on his creativity, intention, and whom he wants to reach.

⁵ Praz says (1982): “The degree of prestige achieved by Painting, thanks to the great Italian masters of the Renaissance, gave rise to the achievement of a victory over its sister art, Poetry; witness to the tireless efforts of poets to emulate painters in the sensuality of their descriptions” (p. 4).

⁶ We will see that it was only in the early days of photography that this happened since the possibility of retouching and modifying the “mimetically perfect” was later verified.

Evidently, in these two relationships, such principles also extend to their respective readers. If we are dealing with the epistemological model in which the Baroque was inserted, readers of the period had to have access to the cognitive key (sign keys) to understand the period's works, without which it would be impossible apprehend what their authors intended. That becomes clear when such works and their authors were considered obscure or incomprehensible in later periods; therefore, readers of later historical periods will lack manuals for their understanding.

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